Articles by "Pay for Performance"
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Four decades of attempts to address overuse have not only failed to rein in overuse, the efforts have contributed to under-utilization and more Americans left behind by design.

Overuse has long been 2 to 4 times higher in highest physician concentration counties. Overuse supports too much workforce for few and results in too little for many. Overuse steals the workforce needed elsewhere and makes it appear that there are deficits of workforce with the need for more graduates - when the problem remains overutilization.
 
Payment Design Plus Profit Motive Plus Political Power
Overutilization is largely the result of the payment design and profit motive and political power. The payment design results in too much paid for highly specialized services and too little for the basic services (primary care, mental health, basic specialties). 
 
Profits are best supported by the march to ever more types of procedures and technologies that are paid the most because they are newest and most subspecialized. The profits by those most organize pave the way for political power - power that prevents true reforms such as more for cognitive, office, and basic services as well as services where most needed for those smallest and least organized. 
 
Too much for too little result, too much profit over the basics, and too much power vs too little - these are what drive the US health care design the wrong way.

Payment Design Diverts Workforce
 
Nurse practitioners and physician assistants have followed the higher payments to new specialties with more added in each specialty. The dollar distributions shaped by payment policy would not allow more primary care physicians, clinicians, or team members.
 
The effects of payment upon the physician workforce are obvious - and this pattern is being repeated in the rapid changes seen in NP and PA workforce. For decades NP and PA were promoted as solutions for primary care, care where needed, and efficient care. 
  • It is obvious that there is no solution for care where needed as the deficits remain despite massive expansions. 
  • Primary care similarly remains stagnant by design.  
  • The NP and PA "efficiency" advantages claimed in primary care did not work out in lowest paid primary care paid even lower. 
NP and PA advantages have best been seen in non-primary care. As the specialty and subspecialty barriers all fell away, the NP and PA advantages shaped new career options. The NP and PA graduates helped highly specialized practices 
  • to capture more market share, 
  • to handle the basics with NP and PA graduates
  • to shift highest paying procedures and services to subspecialty physicians for maximal revenue generations, 
  • to allow care delivery in multiple sites (office, different hospital sites), and increase utilization of existing testing equipment and personnel. 
This has allowed largest systems and practices to cut expensive subspecialty physician costs to the minimum while maximizing services, testing, and billing.

Expansions Facilitate Increases in Workforce, Services, and Overutilization
 
Massive expansions of PA from 1500 to 9000 annual graduates a year and NP 1500 to 20,000 a year since 1980 have substantially contributed to increasing utilization, higher costs, and overuse. 
 
Recent doublings of NP, PA, and DO graduates have not contributed to more primary care as expansions are negated by fewer remaining in primary care.  MD primary care results are shrinking despite expansion - as fewer remain in primary care. There is no other choice. The numbers of positions are limited by the revenue - minus the other costs of delivery and more limited by delivery costs that have been increasing.

Blocked from primary care by the annual revenue limitation of 160 - 180 billion for primary care or 6% of spending (minus expenses), NP and PA and DO and Caribbean and MD expansions have fueled the massive increases in non-primary care workforce.

The workforce design compliments the increased utilization of highest cost services and penalizes basic services. Expansions of graduates cannot improve access as the basic services are all prevented from expansion by payment design. 
 
Suppressing the Basics Accentuates the Highly Specialized
 
Even worse, the deficits of primary care and access facilitate greater utilizations of higher cost services - emergency care, specialty care, subspecialty care, urgent care, and convenience care.

More graduates translates to more workforce and more highly specialized workforce - leaving the basics far behind.

Ever Higher Health Care Costs Are Unopposed

Runaway health care costs have followed 
  • From rapid ever purer expansions of non-primary care workforce
  • Plus rapid expansions of administrative costs 
  • Plus digitalization costs
  • Plus micromanagement costs
The increases in administrative and non-delivery costs have been significant. These include more personnel in administration and management, managed care efforts, managed cost interventions, and managements of high risk patients which have added about the same costs as would have been saved by management efforts (The CBO was right)
 
The consequences of spreadsheet cost cutting have been significant. Physicians have often told the cost cutters of the consequences, but they are long past listening. The cuts look good on paper but translate poorly to the real world where complex interactions between individuals, groups, and society are difficult to capture. The CBO was right, the White House and Steven Brill Were Wrong by Kip Sullivan.
 
Additional and substantial tens of billions a year have been added by HITECH to ACA to MACRA to value based. The Pay for Performance additions are some of the worst, adding higher cost of delivery for no significant change in outcomes (Annals of IM review) while discriminating against those who provide care to more complex patients with inherently lesser outcomes as noted in increasing numbers of studies past 15 already. Pay for Performance has delayed needed reform - especially cognitive vs procedural.
 
The obvious result of so much more for little or no gain in outcomes has been failure in value. The US has obviously been moving the opposite direction from value. This is another reason why attempts at value basis are misguided at best.

Consequences of Cost Cutting (Caused by Overutilization and Costs Too High)

Overutilization has been bad, but innovation and regulation and certification efforts have made the situation worse. Cost cutting has been a very non-specific tool with a four decade history. The collateral damage has been greatest 
  • in primary care with 55% of services delivered
  • in basic services care where needed where margins are thinnest
  • in small practices where cost of delivery increases are most
Those largest, most organized, and most powerful are in the best position 
  • to prevent adverse legislation
  • to reshape regulation is desired ways
  • to influence implementation 
Those doing best are the largest and most organized in places where workforce is most concentrated.

Good business decisions require that essential areas not be cut and may even need to be given increases because they are essential - but this has not happened. Even worse the basics have continued to fall relative to those highest paid and overutilizing - dragging more team members, clinicians, and physicians this direction.

Those smallest, least organized, and most basic have steadily been left behind as overutilization, overregulation, overadministration, and overcertification have continued while costs have worsened, outcomes have worsened, value has worsened, and access has worsened - with the worst impacts on increasing proportions of Americans - your choice of 30 to 50% and increasing.

Closures and compromises of small practices and small hospitals continue where care is most needed, where populations are growing fastest, where fewest health care dollars go already, and where more dollars are required to be shipped to higher concentration settings - by each new permutation of the health care design.

Only those immersed in higher concentrations could fail to see the situations, conditions, environments, and compromises.
 
Research Immersed in Concentrations Results in Policies Rewarding Concentrations
 
The research base has long been immersed in the places and practices and systems that are largest and that most overutilize. The latest designers from managed care to Dartmouth to the present have continued to base their assumptions on this top 20% most concentrated. The research has long ignored those who fail to access services. The data is also distorted when the populations involved have difficulty accessing care in places where insufficient workforce and other access barriers exist - where underutilization is a major problem.
 
The research differences promoted widely have largely been the result of comparisons of different populations - not the various clinical interventions that have gained press.
 
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Recent meetings of family physicians brought up the age old question of expanded scope. Some raised concerns about threats to this scope. As is the usual, what is most important is the context. Where half of Americans are found, there is not a reason to be concerned about scope. 
 
Only in highest concentration settings are family physicians limited - since all specialties other than family medicine concentrate in higher concentration settings.


 
The competition is less and less of a problem regarding broad scope for family physicians in lowest physician concentration counties. Few of the other specialties remain and many are in decline. 
 
This places more burdens upon the remaining family practice workforce. This comes at a bad time as the practices require more time for documentation and there is less time for expanded scope such as hospital and procedural activities.
 
As discussed previously in recent blogs, the payment designs continue to be the major limitations for all of the above workforce types. Generalist and general specialty services are 90% of the services in these lowest concentration counties. The overall payment design pays less for the basics and the basic services are paid less in these counties. This is a poor design where care is more complex and resources are more limited.
 
Notably the attacks on scope have proceeded from insurance and payer designs. 
  • Liability premium costs put the brakes on many procedures - and a key route to better revenue generation in practices sent the least revenue by payment designs. This forced full scope obstetrics beyond many family physicians, unless they predominantly did such work to support the liability premiums. Hospitals are closing and obstetrical services are closing in these 2621 lowest concentration counties also a consequence of payer designs failing for the basic hospital services of these smaller facilities.
  • Government and insurance payers have also dumped assistant surgery - once a key expansion of scope and another revenue generator.
Countdown Workforce in Lowest Concentrations
  • FP positions filled by MD DO NP and PA distribute best at 36% to match up to this 40%. FM is 24% of local workforce where needed and reaches 38% when counties do not have a hospital or in the states such as Nebraska and Kansas. 
  • General internal medicine was 13% of local workforce where needed but is collapsing to 30,000 or below. The 4 times greater multiplier for top concentration settings will substantially reduce this contribution to 5% or below. 
  • Contrary to many studies indicating the need for geriatricians, they fail for distribution where the elderly and most complex elderly are found. Only 13% of geriatricians are found in this 40% of the population where 45% of the elderly are found. Geriatrics fails for financial design reasons - basic services paid too low and complexity too high. Inkind contributions from academic centers, nursing homes, rehab centers, and large hospitals insure that geriatrics remains concentrated along with the physician origins most closely associated with higher concentration settings. 
  • Pediatric workforce is only 6% and stable but pediatric physicians are stacked toward concentrations along with every other specialty other than family medicine. Gender changes, origin changes, and payment changes will further limit distribution. 
  • Mental health fails for lowest concentration counties where this 40% of the population easily has 45% of mental health problems. Only 23% of mental health providers overall and 17% of psychiatrists are found in these counties. 
  • Shrinkage of public health has long complicated care in lowest concentration counties and has also expanded scope. 
  • General surgeons were 27% with general orthopedics at 24% and general obstetrics gynecology at 22%. These and other general surgical specialties have been shrinking at 2 - 4 percentage points a year from 2005 to 2013 in the AMA Masterfile. There has been no sign of stopping. This should not be a surprise since these are the lowest paid services. These are also some of the oldest physicians - an indication that training of these basic surgical types is incapable of addressing care where most Americans are found and are increasing most in elderly, demand, and complexity.
All physician types who could act to reduce family practice scope are concentrating and contracting. This should result in lower physician concentrations overall and higher proportions of family medicine in the lowest concentration county physician workforce. 
 
In addition to challenges of scope, the challenges from patients are also significant - and are substantially increased in these places with lowest resources and workforce.

US Population 40%
SNAP/Food Stamp Spending 42%
Poor Americans 43%
Elderly Americans 43%
Obese Americans 43%
Social Security Spending 43%
Smoking Americans 45%
Preventable Deaths 46%
US Veterans 46 - 48%
Poor Children 47%
Social Security Disability $ 47%
Diabetic Americans 50%
 
40.7% Uninsured 2014 (so much for health insurance expansion as not that much different than the 40.2% of the population in lowest concentration counties)
  • 40.2% Population in 2010
  • 38.6% Population in 1990
  • 36.6% Population in 1970
The lowest concentration counties are fastest growing in numbers (30% faster than US average), in elderly, in demand, and in complexity - only the finances remain stagnant, miring these counties at 115 physicians per 100,000 and likely less.
 
Combinations such as Dual Eligible patients, homebound elderly, poor children, those with more mental health days, and those with poor to fair health status are more likely to be seen in these settings. The permutations that add to complexity are endless but the support has been limited by past, present, and future designs.
 
Housing and other lower cost of living factors shape patients with lowest paying plans into lowest physician concentration counties. Those stuck cannot leave and those driven out of higher concentration counties (financial reasons, lack of affordable housing) accumulate. The health payment plan failures shape the workforce failures.
 
Family physicians increase in proportion as local determinants of health decrease. The payments also decrease for the same office codes. The new Pay for Performance designs place additional limitations with higher costs and more penalties because of the populations in lowest concentration counties. The discrimination has been documented, but the bandwagon of Pay for Performance Rolls On.

The major battle remains the financial design that rewards non-basic services and penalizes those who most serve where needed, their patients, the communities in need of services, and basic health access in the United States.
 
But the new health care law, if enacted, will make matters worse. The impact will be substantial upon Red Counties already hurt by cuts in the supports noted above, with more to come.

 
 
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There are many areas within health care design that need to be addressed. Unfortunately the current designers prefer to persist with approaches that will not address the outcomes improvements needed. The pay for performance bandwagon marches on, but the evidence basis has long fallen short. Those truly dedicated to improvements in health care outcomes must review the evidence and move on to areas that do need to be addressed.




A Quick Summary: Pay for Performance
  • Has failed to deliver on promised improvements in health outcomes (strong evidence including major reviews)
  • Has been costly (EHR, digitalization, management, administration, maintenance, and security for data collection)
  • Has consumed delivery personnel workforce (nurses for example) with conversion to non-delivery personnel
  • Has resulted in further discrimination against the providers where health care delivery is most needed and is already least supported (evidence consistent in dozens of studies)
  • Has distracted health care from the most important area - support of the team members to actually deliver health care and caring
  • Results in disparities in health care dollar distributions and distribution of health care workforce and can worsen health care outcomes because scarce health care dollars are stolen from lowest concentration settings to go to higher concentration settings to pay for the costs of Pay for Performance.
Failure to deliver on promises, increased costs, increased distractions of team members, and two forms of discrimination against places and populations most behind should be a reason to move to real reforms rather than reforms of failed reforms. 


P4P Has Been Critically Reviewed and Is Not Evidence-Based for Patient Outcomes

Pay-for-performance programs may be associated with improved processes of care in ambulatory settings, but consistently positive associations with improved health outcomes have not been demonstrated in any setting. “In summary, we found low-strength, contradictory evidence that P4P programs could improve processes of care, but we found no clear evidence to suggest that they improve patient outcomes.” from The Effects of Pay-for-Performance Programs on Health, Health Care Use, and Processes of Care: A Systematic Review, Annals of Internal Medicine 1/10/17. 

Our findings raise questions about whether pay-for-performance strategies that reward improvement can generate greater improvement among lower performing providers. They also cast some doubt on the extent to which hospitals respond to the specific structure of economic incentives in pay-for-performance programs. 
 

P4P - Theoretical But Not Practical or Relevant

In the minds of those who speculate about health care from far above, it is possible to micromanage health care delivery. Over the last few decades, control has been shifted away from those who provide care to those who manage and administrate and design health care policies. Even worse are those who continue to blame and shame providers, without understanding the complexity of personal care delivery to a wide range of different people in a wide variety of settings with substantial variations in other determinants of health outcomes.

Managed care proponents, stung by defeats in the 1990s, returned with passion for measurement, micromanagement, and shifting risks to providers - but passion won out over evidence basis. The Passionate Assumptions that Conceived ACA 

For those far above immersed in top concentrations, it appears possible to control many things. In the office or hospital working with patients, there are many areas that are impossible to control. Many years or decades have shaped the current presentation. Many of the important interventions take many days or months or even years. Often the framework for health outcomes improvement needs to be completely changed.

Where policies are formed, various leaders are prominent. US health care leaders are groomed by institutions, associations, foundations, and corporations that preach and teach control - a level of control that is not possible in complex human interactions shaped by other complex interactions before and after an encounter or hospital stay.

From the perspective of those delivering care at the community and local level, there are numerous dimensions that are out of the control of health care delivery.

People are far more complex than the ability to compile numerous dimensions of variables and parse out the important interactions and the types of interactions (dichotomous, continuous, conditional) and how these result in outcomes.

Instead of phasing out due to lack of evidence basis, Pay for Performance has multiplied to include Readmissions Penalties, Value Based Payments, and MACRA. MACRA actually arose from the ashes of previous meaningless costly attempts.

The Wrong Directions - Known To Those Who Deliver But Escape Those Who Do Not
  • Process over Performance
  • Form Over Function, 
  • Digitalization/documentation Over Relationship and Outcome
  • Marginalization of Health Personnel 

Readmissions Penalties Costly, Fail in Outcomes Improvements, and Discriminate

Once again we see the themes of minimal relationship of readmissions metrics to outcomes, discrimination against critically needed providers, and outcomes shaped by factors outside of provider control.

My analysis of Readmissions Penalties in the second year of operation indicated top penalties of 1 - 2% levied against 14% of hospitals in the lowest physician concentration counties and against 9% of rural hospitals as compared to 5% average and 3% for urban hospitals. The hospitals in places with more challenging patient situations, complexities, social determinants, local resources, and concentrations of workforce faced greater discrimination.

From the National Cardiovascular Data Registry Study April 26, 2017 - The performance metric for risk-standardized 30-day readmission rates for MI is not associated with quality of care, long-term mortality risk, or long-term readmission risk beyond the first 30 days following discharge.

ACA Proponents including former Presidente Obama fed CMS data and graphics, have indicated improvements in readmissions. Unfortunately these studies fail to consider that readmissions improvements are small change and may have improved because DRGs were a part of the reason for Readmissions issues and other problems. This illustrates the problems of designs focused upon cost cutting with consequences that can be seen decades later in many areas.

From What Obamacare’s Pay-For Performance Programs Mean for Health Care Quality  By Kathryn Nix
  • Readmission penalties discriminate against providers that care for those who are sicker, poorer, older, or have more complex conditions.
  • Readmission improvement attempts can backfire with increases in readmissions for certain conditions.
  • Readmissions rates also have a questionable relationship with other quality measures, varying by condition.
  • Readmission rates are not always preventable. Even if a hospital does succeed in providing the highest quality of care, some readmissions simply are not preventable. Researchers estimate that 23.1 percent of 30-day unplanned readmissions are potentially unavoidable. Meanwhile, the CMS goal for the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program is to reduce 30-day readmission rates by 20 percent by the end of 2013. This would require a 91 percent reduction among those readmissions that are avoidable, which may be unrealistic.
  • Readmission rates often reflect the community and patient factors, not hospital care. Readmission rates reflect lack of local health resources, lack of local primary care access, and poorly coordinated care. Insurance design may contribute to poor coordination.
  • Incentives that distract providers can actually distract from care – by more dollars spent elsewhere, by attention of care givers directed elsewhere, by lower productivity, by financial compromise of the provider, by marginalization of patient needs. 
MACRA ATTACK - Kip Sullivan Best Summarizes The Mess That Is MACRA
  • There are two intractable impediments: Determining which doctor patients “belong” to (the attribution problem); and adjusting measures of physician cost and quality for factors outside of physician control such as patient health status (the risk-adjustment problem). The attribution and risk-adjustment methods used today are crude even for large groups; with the possible exception of a few of the simplest process measures, they are worthless at the individual physician level.
  • The Medicare Payment Advisory Committee (MedPAC) questions whether MACRA can work and raised concerns that it would likely be too complex for individual providers and for CMS.
  • Concerns about MACRA were also raised due to ACOs and primary care home efforts that failed to work out also due to vague definitions, confusion, and burdensome regulation.
Sloppy Risk Adjustment and Attribution Guarantee That MACRA Won't Work
  • Outside the bubble where Congress and CMS live, there is a widespread recognition that CMS cannot measure physician “performance” accurately. Citations from NEJM, MedPAC, and JAMA indicate the major measurement and attribution issues. "In a world where evidence guides policy-making rather than groupthink, CMS would acknowledge this fact. But CMS refuses to do that." 
  • Too much noise (other factors) and not enough signal (consistent data, controls) 
  • Chaos in patient continuity and difficulties assigning a physician to a patient make measurement impossible. A medical home is not really a home if half of the patients are gone in a 3 year period.
Inaccurate data in MACRA has more recently been worsened with cherry-picked data. In other words, the more you study and learn MACRA, the better you look. If you do not distract yourself from care, you will look worse. Not that none of this is about better or worse quality - only about appearance.

Some small practices were excluded for the obvious reason that measurements fail for individual physicians and smaller numbers as noted by the RAND consultant. More options were given for MACRA, but no change other than termination of aberrant Pay for Performance designs can stop the discrimination against those providing more care for those most complex with inherently poor outcomes at higher rates.

The entire concept of ACA was misguided from the start. 
  • Universal adoption of electronic medical records;
  • shifting insurance risk to providers with payments for “bundled services” and “accountable care organizations” (ACOs) so that providers would have an incentive to offer fewer services
  • various pay-for-performance schemes (such as punishing hospitals for “excessive” readmissions).
The passionate assumptions of the designers of Obamacare have set back true reforms such as higher payment for primary care, mental health, and other basic services. Meanwhile those who can charge more and receive more and multiply revenue sources drive higher health care costs alone with the those jumping at their chance to add to the non-delivery costs of health care (administration, management, corporate, shareholder, CEO).

Reasons for Pay for Performance Failure
  • Health care outcomes are substantially not about clinical interventions
  • Health care outcomes are about the patient, their situation, their environment, their behaviors and other personal, local, and community factors shaped since birth
  • Too many assumptions have been made with vague definitions, failure to consider alternative hypotheses, grossly insufficient controls, far too few limitations, and publications that have made it to distribution more because they were timely and fit within the current bandwagon.

In the quest for the perfect,
the result has been marginalization of support
for those who deliver the care.

Any real improvements in health care must pass the test of application specific to the team members who perform the functions associated with health care delivery.

There has been an incredible emphasis placed upon measurement with rapid increases in administrative costs. This has also occurred during the current Era of Cost Cutting focus - which has also been an era of rapid chaotic change. The impact upon delivery team members has been predictable as has been confirmed.
  • Damage to morale and motivation
  • Burnout 
  • Decreased productivity
This is most readily seen in the office based and cognitive areas with stagnant payments and responsibility for over 70% of services. Primary care with just 6 - 8% of health care dollars for 55% of services has been impacted the most and also has the greatest impact upon the most Americans.

In typical fashion, the leaders of health care have continued to support designs that attempt to fix health care from far above while failing to realize the most basic fact that health care is grassroots, local, personal, and community-based.

The literature regarding health care outcomes has major issues. Many of the findings can be explained by differences in the places of care, the populations, the resources, the level of organization, and the situations and complexity differences.

Be sure to review The Tyranny of Health Care Research and read some of the listed material from Dr. Saurabh Jha and others to see if science has advanced much in the past 100 years since the flawed race vs intelligence studies. See if the lazy generalizations or the Tyranny of the Aggregate strikes a chord. Does it make sense to pay attention to the mean that reflects so few that were studied?

For a critical review of any research involving quality or costs. Consider the following
  • Health care outcomes are substantially not about clinical interventions that only shape 10 to 15% of outcomes
  • Health care outcomes are about the patient, their situation, their environment, their behaviors and other personal, local, and community factors shaped since birth (Over 60%) that impact outcomes before, during, and after an encounter, procedure, or hospital stay.
  • Too many assumptions 
  • Too few controls, usually convenience variables
  • Lack of consideration of alternative hypotheses
  • Too few limitations expressed
 Consider Social and other Non-Clinical Determinants of Health